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The Executive Line Item Veto and




In Clinton v. City ofNew York,' the Supreme Court invalidated the Line
Item Veto Act,2 legislation that for the first time granted the President the
power to "cancel" certain spending items and tax benefits from enacted
appropriations bills. The Court found that this mechanism violated Article I's
procedures governing the enactment of federal legislation.3 Unremarkably, as
the Court explained in its conclusion, a bill must pass both the House of
Representatives and the Senate, and then be presented to the President, m
precisely the same form, before it becomes law:
If one paragraph of that text had been omitted at any one of those three
stages, [the law] would not have been validly enacted. If the Line Item
Veto Act were valid, it would authorize the President to create a different
law - one whose text was not voted on by either House of Congress or
presented to the President for signature.4
In common with the Court's other recent decisions striking down innovative
governance mechanisms as mconsistent with specific checks and balances
designed to preserve the separation of powers,' commentators undoubtedly
* Visiting Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law; Professor, Univer-
sity of Florida College of Law. The author would like to thank Mark Grunewald and Brian
Murchison for their valuable input.
1. 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200(1996) (codified at2 U.S.C. §§ 691-692 (Supp.
H 1996)).
3. See Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2108 (1998).
4. Id, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (Presentment Clause).
5. See Plautv. SpendthriftFarm, Inc., 514U.S. 211,225-30,239-40 (1995); Metropoli-
tan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252,
265-77 (1991); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,721-34 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
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will assail the Court's latest opinion for its narrow formalism.6 Indeed, even
Justice Scalia took issue with the majority for its unreflective formalism,
suggesting instead that the statute raised nondelegation concerns that required
a less rigid constitutional analysis.7
This essay focuses on one narrow aspect of the controversy surrounding
the line item veto that has gone largely unnoticed to date - namely, the simi-
larity between the President's exercise of that authority and the widely
accepted power of the courts to sever unconstitutional provisions from previ-
ously enacted legislation. Courts routinely sever invalidated provisions from
statutes even without an express delegation of authority to do so. In effect, the
judiciary has asserted a limited line item veto power over legislation. Natu-
rally, the two techniques of postenactment statutory "editing" without for-
mally amending the legislation have different ongms and applications, but
they also share striking commonalities that cast serious doubt on the major-
ity's Presentment Clause analysis.
11. Severability n the Courts
Severability of unconstitutional provisions has a long tradition and
powerful justifications.8 Judicial restraint counsels against striking down an
944-59 (1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-41 (1976) (per cunam). Not all of the
Court's recent separation-of-powers decisions had this character, several of them seemingly
support a turn toward functionalism. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 882-92
(1991); Mistrettav. United States, 488 U.S. 361,380-412(1989); Momson v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654,670-97(1988); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,847-58 (1986); see also Martin S. Flaherty,
The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1732-44 (1996); Brian C. Murchison,
Interpretation and Independence: How Judges Use the Avoidance Canon in Separation of
Powers Cases, 30 GA. L. REv. 85, 112-14 (1995).
6. See TheSupreme Court, 1997 Term-Leading Cases, 112 HARv. L. REV. 122, 127-32
(1998). For some of the recent and generally critical commentary about the Act but predating
the Court's ultimate decision on the merits, see generally Robert C. Byrd, The Control of the
Purse and the Line Item VetoAct, 35 HARv. J. oNLEGIs. 297 (1998); Michael J. Gerhardt, The
Bottom Line on the Line-Item Veto Act of 1996, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 233 (1997);
Lawrence Lessig, Lessons from a Line Item Veto Law, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1659 (1997);
Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Future of the Item Veto, 83 IOwA L. REv. 79 (1997).
7. See Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Mhe doctrine of unconstitutional delegation, which is at issue here, is preeminently not a
doctrine of technicalities. The title of the Line Item Veto Act. has succeeded in faking out
the Supreme Court.").
8. For example, in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), the Court held
only one section of the original Judiciary Act unconstitutional without suggesting that this
rendered the remainder of the Act inoperative. See id at 176-78; see also Bank of Hamilton v.
Lessee of Dudley, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 492, 526 (1829) (Marshall, C.J.) ("If any part of the act be
unconstitutional, the provisions of that part may be disregarded, while full effect will be given
LINE ITEM VETO
entire piece of legislation on the basis of some constitutional infirmity in a
minor provision. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, "a court should
refrain from invalidating more of the statute than is necessary " In some
instances, of course, a statute cannot or should not remain in force after a
court has invalidated one of its central provisions, and the Supreme Court has
offered various tests to decide the centrality of an invalidated provision.° Nor
has thejudiciary limited itself to "editing" statutes containing unconstitutional
provisions. For instance, courts sometimes sever portions of agency rules
invalidated on constitutional or, more typically, statutory grounds rather than
strike down a whole set of regulations promulgated during the same rule-
making proceeding."
Although severability was originally a judicial invention, legislatures
now frequently include severability clauses (sometimes referred to as "sav-
ings" clauses) in statutes.12 In fact, Congress occasionally even includes a
"fallback" provision as a contingency designed to replace a particular section
of uncertain constitutionality if a court invalidates and then severs that sec-
tion. 3 Less frequently, Congress may include an "inseverability" clause in an
to such as are not repugnant to the constitution "); Robert L. Stem, Separability and
Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARV. L. REV. 76, 106-28 (1937) (canvassing
origins of this doctrine).
9. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (plurality opinion); see Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) (per cunam); El Paso & N.E. Ry. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87, 96
(1909) ("[W]henever an act of Congress contains unobjectionable provisions separable from
those found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of this court to so declare, and to maintain the
act in so far as it is valid."); People ex rel. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, 129 N.E. 202,
208 (N.Y. 1920) (Cardozo, J.) ("Our right to destroy is bounded by the limits of necessity. Our
duty is to save, unless in saving we pervert."); 2NORMANJ. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CoNsTRucTIoN ch. 44 (5th ed. 1993); Adrian Vermeule, Saving Construc-
tions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1950-54 (1997).
10. See infra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
11. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281,294-95 (1988); Davis County Solid
Waste Management & Energy Recovery Special Serv. Dist. v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1454, 1459-60
(D.C. Cir. 1997); see also In re Reyes, 910 F.2d 611, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1990) (refusing to sever
invalid section of executive order).
12. For a recent example of such a clause, see the Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub.
L. No. 101-336, § 514, 104 Stat. 327, 378 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12213 (1994))
("Should any provision in this Act be found to be unconstitutional by a court of law, such
provision shall be severed from the remainder of the Act, and such action shall not affect the
enforceability of the remaining provisions of the Act.").
13. See Bowsherv. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,718-19,735-36(1986) (giving effectto fallback
provision in Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act); Jim C. Chen, Appointments with Disaster- The
Unconstitutionality ofBinationalArbitral Review Under the UnitedStates-Canada Free Trade
Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 1455, 1495-96 (1992) (discussing operation of fallback
provision in legislation to implement trade pact); see also Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728,
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effort to prevent the courts from sustaining a piece of controversial legislation
in the event that they invalidate one central provison.4
Oddly enough, courts do not invariably honor either of these explicit
legislative commands. Generally, courts will abide by severability clauses
when they appear in a statute, though that may simply reflect their tendency
to sever invalidated provisions whether or not Congress included an express
severability clause at the time of enactment.'" The absence of such a clause
will not, however, prevent ajudge from severing an unconstitutional provision
from a statute.' 6 Courts freely imply a legislative preference for severability
in order to save the remainder of an enactment. Indeed, they occasionally
sever invalidated provisions even in the face of inseverability clauses. 7
One of the most important recent applications of the doctrine favoring
severability arose after the Supreme Court invalidated the legislative veto in
INS v. Chadha."8 Because similar provisions appeared in almost 200 other
statutes, the Court recognized the importance of the severability issue, 9 and
734 (1984) (describing severability clause that also directed courts to invalidate rather than
expand benefits provided under that subsection if they held it unconstitutionally under-
inclusive).
14. See ABNER J. MiKVA & ERic LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRE-
TATIONANDTHELEGISLATIVEPROCESS 167-68 (1997); IsraelE. Friedman, CommentInsevera-
bility Clauses in Statutes, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 903, 903 & n.4, 907 (1997).
15. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 931-35 (1983) (holding provision severable
because nothing in legislative history overcame presumption ofseverability created by inclusion
ofexpress severability clause and because what remained of statute was fully operative); Dorchy
v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 (1924) (noting that severability clause "provides a rule of con-
struction which may sometimes aid in determining [legislative] intent. But it is an aid merely;
not an inexorable command.").
16. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186-87 (1992); Alaska Airlines, Inc.
v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987) ("In the absence of a severability clause, Congress'
silence is just that- silence- and does not raise a presumption against severability."); United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1968) (noting that "the ultimate determination of
severability will rarely turn on the presence or absence of such a clause").
17. See Friedman, supra note 14, at 907-08; see also id. at 910-18 (criticizing tendency
of courts to accord comparable treatment to severability and inseverability clauses, and arguing
that courts generally should treat latter as mandatory).
18. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
19. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 977 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that
almost 200 laws included legislative veto provisions). The Courtin Chadha severed that partic-
ular veto. See id. at 931-35. Butsee id. at 1014-16 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (disagreeing that
Congress would have given agency power to suspend deportations without legislative veto as
check on exercise of this discretion); id. at 1014 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I do not believe
we should expand the statute in this way without some clear indication that Congress intended
such an expansion."); id. at 979 n.16 (White, J., dissenting) (concluding, with regard to severa-
bility question, that "the Court's rewriting of the Act flouts the will of Congress"); Note, The
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it soon had to face this question in subsequent cases. InAlaskaAirlines, Inc.
v. Brock, ° the Supreme Court attempted to clarify its approach to severability-
[The] relevant inquiry m evaluating severability is whether the statute will
function m a manner consistent with the intent of Congress. Some
delegations of power to the Executive or to an independent agency may
have been so controversial or so broad that Congress would have been
unwilling to make the delegation without a strong oversight mechanism.
The final test, for legislative vetoes as well as for other provisions, is the
traditional one: the unconstitutional provision must be severed unless the
statute created in its absence is legislation that Congress would not have
enacted.2'
Of course, the statute minus the severed provision was not in fact the legisla-
tion that Congress enacted,' whatever one might think of the odds that this
alternative version would have fared as well in the legislative process. The
statute at issue inAlaskaAirlines did not include a severability clause, though
it amended an earlier statute that contained such a clause.' The Court did not
trouble itself with the question of whether Congress had included a contin-
gency plan in the event that a court invalidated one provision; instead, it
reaffirmed a willingness to sever invalidated provisions even in those cases
in which Congress had failed to include a severability provision.24
Aftermath ofChadha. The Impact ofthe SeverabilityDoctrine on the Management ofIntergov-
ernmental Relations, 71 VA. L. REV. 1211, 1216-18 (1985) (same).
20. 480 U.S. 678 (1987).
21. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685 (footnote omitted); see Champlin Ref. Co. v.
Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210,234 (1932) ("Unless it is evidentthatthe legislature would
not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is
not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.").
22. See AlaskaAirlines, Inc. v. Donovan, 766 F.2d 1550,1560 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (conced-
ing that Congress did not enact legislation without severed provision), aff'd sub nom. Alaska
Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987); see also United States v. National Treasury
Employees' Union, 513 U.S. 454, 479 (1995) (noting Court's "obligation to avoid judicial
legislation" and leaving "to Congress the task of drafting a narrower statute"); Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238,312 (1936) (suggesting that, in absence of separability clause, "the rule
is against mutilation of a statute"); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 70-71 (1922) (warning that
severability clause does not authorize judicial amendment of statute); American Booksellers
Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 333 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[E]ven the broadest severability
clause does not permit a federal court to rewrite as opposed to excise. Rewriting is work for the
legislature "), aff'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
23. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L.No. 95-504,92 Stat. 1705 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of49 U.S.C.); see also Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-726, § 1504, 72 Stat. 731, 811 (severability clause).
24. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686-87 & n.8 (1987).
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The Alaska Airlines test requires a counterfactual inquiry,' asking
whether the invalidated provision was essential to the legislative compromise
that led to the bill's enactment - in which case it should not be severed,
perhaps even in the face of explicit directions from Congress to the contrary -
or else mere boilerplate whose initial exclusion would not have altered the
likelihood for passage of the remainder of the legislation. Only rarely have
the courts declined to sever a legislative veto and invalidated the entire legis-
lation.26 In a different context, Justice Blackmun went so far as to suggest
severing a problematic feature from a distinct enactment not before the Court
in order to keep the statute under consideration intact, even though that law
contained an explicit severability and fallback provision." The majority in
that case declined, however, to "perform th[is] type of creative and imagina-
tive statutory surgery ,2 The failure to abide by explicit severability or insev-
erability clauses, when Congress has included them, seems difficult to defend.
The rule favoring severability in the absence of any legislative guidance
makes more sense as it reflects judicial restraint and deference to as much of
the legislature's will as comports with the Constitution, but one must not
forget that this practice effectively leaves in place a statute that differs from
the legislation that emerged after bicameral consideration and presentment to
the President.
In commenting on Chadha fifteen years ago, Professor Tribe noted the
irony that severance of the legislative veto had created new legislation "by
25. Cf Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation- in the Classroom and in the Court-
room, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983) (characterizing those methods of statutory interpreta-
tion as "imaginative reconstruction").
26. See City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900, 905-09 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(declining to sever legislative veto from Impoundment Control Act of 1974); EEOC v. CBS,
Inc., 743 F.2d 969, 971-74 (2d Cir. 1984) (declining to sever legislative veto from Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1977). Similarly, m other contexts, courts have declined to sever only infrequently.
See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,87 n.40 (1982)
(plurality opinion); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 83 (1976); Railroad Retire-
ment Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 362 (1935).
27. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 783-87 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(proposing invalidation ofprovision in law first establishing General Accounting Office, which
allowed Congress to remove Comptroller General for cause, rather than invalidating and sever-
ing portion ofGramm-Rudman-Hollings Act that authorized Comptroller to demand that Presi-
dent issue sequestration orders when budget deficit exceeded certain thresholds).
28. Id. at 736; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,883 (1997) (explainingthatsevera-
bility clause did not authorize broad "textual surgery"). But cf Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some
Thoughts on Judicial Authority to Repair Unconstitutional Legislation, 28 CLEv. ST. L. REv.
301, 316-24 (1979) (defending power of courts to remedy unconstitutionally underinclusive
benefits statutes by expanding their coverage rather than invalidating them, even though this
involves courts in form of legislating).
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judicial fiat" without satisfying Article I's bicameralism and presentment
requirements.29 He did not, however, thereby mean to question the constitu-
tionality of the judiciary's power to sever invalidated provisions from a
statute, instead suggesting weakness in the Court's formalism." Clinton v.
City ofNew York did not itself raise a severability question, but one can make
the same point even more forcefully about the majority's narrow conception
of Article I of the Constitution. Although commentators have criticized the
Supreme Court's approach to deciding the severability of particular provi-
sions, 31 apparently no one has suggested that the judiciary's assertion of that
power violates Article I's "finely wrought" procedures for legislating. 2
III Severability in the White House
Ifjudicial editing of validly enacted statutes passes constitutional muster,
even in the absence of a legislative delegation of authority to do so, what
differentiates the President's use of a severability power when Congress
clearly has delegated that authority? None of the Supreme Court or lower
court opinions resolving the different challenges to the Line Item Veto Act
addressed this analogy 33 Indeed, none of the briefs filed with the Supreme
29. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law by Any Other Name?,
21 HARV. J. ONLEGis. 1, 22-23 (1984).
30. See id. at 25-26.
31. See Mark L. Movsesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. Rnv. 41,
67-82 (1995) (criticizing application of atextual approach to severability borrowed from
contract law); John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REv. 203, 205-06, 211 (1993)
(criticizing Alaska Airlines test as unduly speculative and departing from Supreme Court's
growing emphasis on textualism in statutory interpretation).
32. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,951 (1983). The primary problem in Chadha, of
course, was that Congress retained for itself a role in the execution of the laws, a function that
the majority considered improper for a body only designed to operate in a legislative capacity.
See id at 951-59; id. at 953-54 n.16 ("Congress' authority to delegate portions of its power to
administrative agencies provides no support for the argument that Congress can constitutionally
control administration of the laws by way of a congressional veto."). The Court did not, how-
ever, cast any doubt on the authority of Congress to delegate to the Attorney General the power
to waive statutory deportation requirements in appropriate cases. See id ("Executive action
under legislatively delegated authority that might resemble 'legislative' action in some respects
is not subject to [bicameralism and presentment requirements] for the reason that the Constitu-
tion does not so require. That kind of Executive action is always subject to check by the terms
of the legislation that authorized it. "); see also id at 984-89 (White, J., dissenting) (same).
33. See City ofNew York v. Clinton, 985 F Supp. 168 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 118S. Ct. 2091,
2108 n.43 (1998) (finding it unnecessary to determine whetherprovisions m Line Item Veto Act
held unconstitutional were severable, and noting that Congress considered but failed to include
severability clause in final legislation); Byrd v. Raines, 956 F Supp. 25 (D.D.C.), vacated, 521
U.S. 811, 820-30 (1997) (vacating judgment of district court for lack of standing).
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Court suggested it, even though the parties had briefed the severability issue
because of the possibility that the Court would invalidate only the President's
power to cancel some tax benefits and leave him the veto power over certain
spending items."4 Only a single recent commentator has hinted at the analogy,
and he did so without any real elaboration." Perhaps no one fully anticipated
the extreme formalism adopted by the majority, especially in the wake of
some of the Supreme Court's recent separation-of-powers decisions seemingly
endorsing a more functional approach. 6
In any event, it seems implausible to argue that legislation which success-
fully ran the gauntlet of Article I's bicameralism and presentment require-
ments must remain forever unchanged absent a second full legislative round
designed to amend the original handiwork of Congress. The courts have, in
effect, selectively and judiciously edited portions out of the United States
Code for decades without drawing any strong objection, notwithstanding the
fact that neither the Constitution nor any statute invites the judicial branch to
participate in the legislative process in this manner. The decision to deny the
President an equal power when Congress saw fit to grant that authority must
rest, if at all, on some other foundation.
This analogy does not mean the two forms of editing are identical in all
important respects. On the contrary, courts usually sever only when legisla-
tion passed by the other two branches of government suffers from some
constitutional infirmity, and they do so only at the behest of a litigant, though
"unconstitutionality is not the only reason an invalid clause or provision may
be severed from a statute."' 7 In effect, Congress never had the power to
34. See BrieffortheAppellant, Clintonv. City ofNew York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998) (No.
97-1374), available in 1998 WL 263832, at*48 n.28; AmicusBriefforHon. Henry J. Waxman
et al. in Support ofAppellees, id., available in 1998 WL 283208, at * 17-*25; see also Michael
B. Rappaport, Veto Burdens andthe Line Item VetoAct, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 771,794-97 (1997)
(arguing that statute's grant of cancellation authority only for bills "signed" by President (but
not those enacted after congressional override of Presidential veto) unconstitutionally burdened
President's choice in exercising general veto power, but concluding that this aspect of statute
was severable from remainder).
35. See Gordon T. Butler, The Line Item Veto and the Tax Legislative Process: A Futile
Effort atDeficitReduction, but a Step Toward Tax Integrity, 49 HASTiNGs L.J. 1,39-40(1997)
(citing J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe
and Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 437, 477-78 (1990)).
36. See supra note 5.
37 Carolyn McNiven, Comment, Using Severability Clauses to Solve the Attainment
Deadline Dilemma in Environmental Statutes, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1255, 1286 n.149 (1992); see
id. at 1293-94 (advocating that courts make use of express severability clauses to edit out of
statutes provisions that have become obsolete). For instance, courts also may decline to enforce
a statutory provision on sub-constitutional grounds, as happens when an older provision
conflicts with a more recent enactment. See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266-67 (1981)
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consider such a provision, so its subsequent deletion by the courts reestab-
lishes an equilibrium. In addition, judicial severance amounts to statutory
editing only in a figurative sense. A court does not actually delete anything
from the United States Code; it only declines to enforce any statutory provi-
sions that conflict with the Constitution." Ofcourse, the President's cancella-
tion authority operated m a similar fashion. 9
In contrast, when the President cancels a spending item or tax benefit in
an appropriations bill, he does so on policy grounds, limited only by the
substantive standards provided by Congress to constrain the exercise of this
discretion. Similarly, on a few occasions, Congress has delegated to agencies
the power to issue regulations altering express statutory requirements.4 °
Professor Sargentich persuasively distinguished the line item veto from those
delegations by noting that, m contrast to an agency's interpretation of its
enabling statute that it can later and sometimes dramatically revise, the
President cannot undo a cancellation unilaterally, but must await new legisla-
tion if he wishes to remstate the item.4 One could, however, make the same
point about judicial invalidation and severance - as distinguished from
interpretations of statutes that they may revisit and revise, it is not clear that
courts could "unsever" a particular provision if they later harbored second-
thoughts about the decision to invalidate it.42 In either case, if the President
(recognizing "the maxim of construction that the more recent of two irreconcilably conflicting
statutes governs," but straning to reconcile statutes because of canon disfavoring implied
repeals). Moreover, some severability clauses apply only to provisions held "unconstitutional,"
42 U.S.C. § 12213 (1994), but others apply more broadly to provisions held "invalid," 2 U.S.C.
§ 1438 (Supp. 111996).
38. See Shepherd v. City of Wheeling, 4 S.E. 635,637 (W Va. 1887); 39 Op. Att'y Gen.
22, 22-23 (1937) (explaining "that the courts have no real power to repeal or abolish a statute,
and that notwithstanding a decision holding it unconstitutional a statute continues to remain on
the statute books"); Nagle, supra note 31, at 228-29.
39. See Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at2120 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("WhenthePresident'canceled'
the two appropriations measures now before us, he did not repeal any law nor did he amend any
law. He simplyfollowed the law, leaving the statutes, as they are literally written, intact.").
40. See 26 U.S.C. § 163(i)(5)(A) (1994) (allowing IRS to issue rules "providing for
modifications to the provisions" concerning tax treatment of high yield discount obligations);
47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (1994) (authorizing FCC to "modify any [tarifffiling] requirement made
by this section"); see also Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of
Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REv. 873, 882 n.32, 931 & n.217
(discussing delegations to agencies of power to waive otherwise applicable statutory require-
ments in particular cases).
41. See Sargentich, supra note 6, at 109-12.
42. Cf William Michael Treanor & Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Overruling and the
Revival of"Uneonstitutional"Statutes, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1902, 1906 (1993) (suggesting that
certain "statutes thatwere unconstitutional underthe rule enunciated in the invalidating decision
should not be revived when the invalidating decision is overturned"). The authors argued that
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or the judiciary has a change of heart about the merits of, respectively, a
cancellation or severability decision, it appears that only Congress enjoys the
power to reinstate the provision in question.
In order to draw an even closer parallel, one might ask whether a Presi-
dent could simply assert the power to sever those provisions from legislation
that the President deemed unconstitutional. When signing bills into law,
Presidents sometimes express doubts about the constitutionality of some
aspect of the legislation, and they may resist complying with those provisions
or else direct the Department of Justice not to defend against another litigant's
judicial challenge to the statute.43 Although some scholars have suggested
that the President might be able to justify asserting an inherent item veto (or
"unbundling") power even over provisions of undoubted constitutionality, to
counteract expansions in the size and scope of congressionally presented
"bills, '44 the President probably could not unilaterally assert the power to
cancel or selectively sever items from duly enacted legislation absent a con-
gressional delegation of such a power.4" Yet the courts have done precisely
this issue remains open among the federal courts, explaining that the Supreme Court has
assumed without deciding that statutes previously held unconstitutional are revived automati-
cally once it overrules its constitutional holding. See id. at 1908-12. The state courts have
made this point more clearly. See id. at 1912-15. In contrast, when Congress repeals legislation
that itself had repealed earlier legislation, it does not thereby resurrect the earlier enactment.
See I U.S.C. § 108 (1994); see also Bender v. United States, 93 F.2d 814, 816 (3d Cir. 1937)
(explaining that this provision altered "the common-law rule that the repeal of a repealing act
revived the former act").
43. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 n.13 (1983) (explaining that "it is not uncom-
mon for Presidents to approve legislation containing parts which are objectionable on constitu-
tional grounds"); Walter E. Dellinger, III, Legal Opinion from the Office ofLegal Counsel to
the Honorable Abner J. Mikva, 48 ARK. L. REV. 313, 323-31 (1995) (listing examples); Knsty
L. Carroll, Comment, Whose Statute Is It Anyway?" Why and How Courts Should Use Presi-
dential Signing Statements When Interpreting Federal Statutes, 46 CATH. U. L. REv. 475, 494
& n. 105 (1997) (noting that President Reagan used signing statements on at least two occasions
to "severfl provisions from laws that he said were unconstitutional"); id. at 497 & n.122
(discussing same for President Bush). For an analysis of claims that the President has an
independent obligation to enforce constitutional limits on legislation, see Gary Lawson &
Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWAL. REV.
1267 (1996); Christine E. Burgess, Note, When May a President Refuse to Enforce the Law?,
72 TEX. L. REV. 631 (1994).
44. See J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Why Did President Bush Repudiate the
"Inherent"Line-Item Veto?, 9 J.L.&POL. 39,47-54 (1992); see also Sidak & Smith, supra note
35, at 476-77 (suggesting that President could rely on severability clause to justify exercising
inherent veto to excise unconstitutional provisions bundled into bill: "Through this [sever-
ability] language Congress would define the seams along which the various bills in an omnibus
measure were sewn together.").
45. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1124 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The 'line-
item veto' does not exist in the federal Constitution, and the executive branch cannot bring a
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that in severing invalidated provisions from statutes which fail to include an
explicit severability clause.
In some respects, cancellation by the President has a less dramatic effect
on the content of legislative enactments than doesjudicial severability First,
the cancellation generally affects provisions with a more limited time horizon,
typically only for the fiscal year covered by the appropriations bill, whereas
judicial severance of an invalidated portion of a statute has a longer-term
impact. Second, the President has a short window of opportunity within
which to exercise the line item veto, whereasjudicial invalidation may occur
years or decades later, long after the original impetus for the legislation has
dissipated. Finally, Congress remains free to pass legislation disapproving the
President's exercise of the line item veto and reinstating the canceled item,
though in practice this will require mustering a two-thirds majority, whereas
Congress cannot resurrect an unconstitutional provision severed by a court.46
Although significant distinctions remain between these two forms of
postenactment editing of legislation, the Executive cancellation power granted
by Congress broadly resembles the judiciary's approach to severability In
this respect, Justices Scalia and Breyer, joined in their separate opinions by
Justice O'Connor, correctly recast the issue as one concerning the eminently
more forgiving nondelegation doctrine.47 When legislation includes a severa-
bility clause,judicial severance of an invalid provision from the remainder of
the statute essentially enforces a properly enacted legislative response to an
anticipated postenactment contingency 4 The Line Item Veto Act gave the
President what amounted to an express severability power.
de facto 'line-item veto' into existence by promulgating orders to suspend parts of statutes
which the President has signed into law."), withdrawn inpart on other grounds, 893 F.2d 205,
208 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (per cunam); cf Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 42-49
(1975) (invalidating on statutory grounds President Nixon's impoundment of EPA appropria-
tions intended for states and localities).
46. Cf. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529-36 (1997) (invalidating Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 as improper effort to ovemde Court's less protective recent
interpretations of Free Exercise Clause of First Amendment). Congress can, however, attempt
to rescind the statute if the absence of the severed provision renders the remainder unacceptable,
recraft the invalidated provision to skirt the constitutional infirmity and reinsert it in the statute,
or initiate an amendment to the Constitution to overrule the Court's invalidation.
47. See Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2115-18 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2123-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771-74 (1996) (upholding delegation of rulemaking
authority to military to prescribe aggravating factors in court-martial capital cases). But see
BernardW. Bell, The Nondelegation Doctrine, the Rules/Standards Dilemma, andtheLnetem
Veto, 44 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999) (criticizing this approach).
48. See Evan H. Carinker, Note, A Norm-Based Remedial Model for Underinclusive
Statutes, 95 YALE L.J. 1185, 1208 n.87 (1986). It does so even more clearly when Congress
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV 235 (1999)
IV Conclusion
In short, if the majority in Clinton v. City of New York had paid closer
attention to the judiciary's well-established role in editing legislation, some-
times long after enactment, it might have avoided premising its decision on
the seemingly untenable Presentment Clause grounds that it did. If severance
does not amount to "legislating" by the courts, even when Congress has not
expressly delegated that power, then cancellation by the President, pursuant
to an express delegation from Congress, also does not merit that characteriza-
tion and the concomitant requirement for satisfying the commands of Article
I. The Line Item Veto Act may well suffer from some other constitutional
infirmity, but not the one that the Court identified in this case.
coupled a severability clause with a fallback provision designed to replace a particular section
of the statute in the event of its severance. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
NOTES

